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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Commercial Speech-Municipal
Ordinance Which Prohibits the Display of "For Sale" and
"Sold" Signs on Residential Property in Order To Prevent
Panic Selling is Constitutional. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
351 (1976).
A real estate broker and a landowner in the township of Willing-
boro, New Jersey, challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance
which prohibited the display of "for sale" and "sold" signs on resi-
dential property.' The asserted purpose of the ordinance was to
prevent panic selling by whites in an integrated neighborhood!
Plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance deprived them of their right to
free speech under the first and fourteenth amendments.3
The district court4 concluded that the prohibition against the
signs was essentially censorial and, therefore, it abridged the prop-
erty owners' first amendment guarantee of free speech.5 Further-
more, the court noted that the effect of the ordinance could be
racially discriminatory by denying blacks an equal opportunity to
buy housing in Willingboro.' It said that without the signs, the only
way a buyer could learn what houses were for sale was through
realtors? This would enable real estate agents to "steer" clients in
such a way as to perpetuate existing racial patterns in housing'
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and
held the signs were primarily commercial speech.9 The court stated
1. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 351 (1976).
2. Id. at 791.
3. Id. at 789.
4. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, No. 74-1120 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 1975).
5. Id. at 5-6.
6. Id. at 4-5.
7. Id.
8. Id. The district court also noted that the ordinance infringed on the constitutional right
to travel since members of minority groups might be denied a fair opportunity to buy suitable
housing. Id. at 5.
9. 535 F.2d at 794. The court of appeals concluded that plaintiffs did not have standing
to raise a third party interest in the right to travel. Id. Moreover, since there were other
methods of learning about what houses were for sale and since the informational effect of the
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that the message inherent in a "for sale" sign is a proposal for a
commercial transaction.'" The message inherent in a "sold" sign is
that a commercial transaction has taken place." Since neither mes-
sage contains comment on social policy, political protest, or similar
elements of pure speech,'2 the court found that the governmental
interests forwarded by the ordinance sufficiently outweighed any
infringement on first amendment rights.'3 While the court of ap-
peals did not deny the possibility of a future conspiracy by realtors
and homeowners to forego other forms of advertising and to discrim-
inate against black buyers, the court pointed out that this possibil-
ity existed with or without the signs." Such a conspiracy would be
difficult where integration has already been successfully achieved,
as it has in Willingboro,'5 and the court lacked evidence of such
intentions in the community." The court of appeals held the ordi-
nance "effected no racial classifications. It fell, without discrimina-
tion, on all realtors and on all races, colors and creeds alike."' 7 Thus,
the court concluded that the ordinance was constitutional.',
The first amendment declares that "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."' 9 The Supreme
Court has held that these rights are so fundamental as to be compre-
hended within the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due pro-
absence of signs fell equally upon blacks and whites, the court concluded that no one had
suffered a deterring effect on his right to travel. Id. at 804.
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Warth, plaintiffs, challenging a zoning ordi-
nance which excluded low and moderate income families, failed to establish they were injured
and thus were not able to raise the rights of third parties. Id. at 508. But see Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), in which tenants were found to have standing
under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970), to raise the rights of others
denied housing in their apartment complex because of the racially discriminatory policies of
the landlord. Id. at 212. Plaintiffs had asserted that the rental policies had deprived them of
the social and economic benefits of a racially integrated neighborhood. Id. at 208.
10. 535 F.2d at 796.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 794.
13. Id. at 795.
14. Id. at 803-04.
15. Integration in Willingboro was effected in response to a court injunction against ra-
cially based housing discrimination there. Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimina-
tion, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
16. 535 F.2d at 804.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 805.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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cess.1' Thus these rights deserve protection from impairment by the
states."' The presumption is that a statute is constitutional, and the
ordinary standard of review regarding constitutionality is whether
the law has a reasonable relationship to the desired goals.2" How-
ever, a stricter test is applied when legislation appears to infringe
on freedom of speech. The state can directly restrict the right of
freedom of speech only to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the state may lawfully protect. 4
Incidental restrictions may be imposed on first amendment rights
if they are in furtherance of a legitimate government interest. How-
ever, the interest cannot be related to the suppression of communi-
cation. The restrictions must be substantially related to the inter-
ests furthered and cannot be greater than necessary to achieve the
protection of the government interests. 5
Not all speech enjoys this rigorous protection. The Supreme Court
has distinguished pure speech from other types of speech, such as
libel and obscenity, which are excepted from the first amendment
guarantee of freedom. 6 While commercial speech falls within these
exceptions, successive Court opinions have increasingly emphasized
first amendment protection of any pure speech element in advertis-
ing.
In Valentine v. Chrestensen,7 the Supreme Court identified com-
mercial speech as a proper subject of regulation within the police
powers of the community." Respondent had attempted to evade a
20. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664-66 (1925).
21. Id.
22. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). In Day-Brite, the Supreme
Court applied the test to deprivation of property rights. The Court upheld a state law forbid-
ding the withholding of pay from employees who absented themselves from work in order to
vote. Id. at 424-25.
23. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
24. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). For a critical
appraisal of the implication of "presumptive invalidity" of any law which touches communi-
cation, see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97
(1949).
25. Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1976). See Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440, 2453 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. 396, 409-15 (1974); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Quaker
Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
26. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
27. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
28. Id. at 54-55.
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local ordinance against distribution of circulars in the street. He had
printed a flier containing both a protest against the city's denial of
wharfage for a submarine and an advertisement for an exhibition of
the same ship. 9 The Supreme Court held that since profit was the
primary aim of the circulars, they did not derive first amendment
protection from the appended elements of pure speech."
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,3 the Supreme Court held that newspaper advertisements
were commercial speech, and that a city ordinance which prohibited
the classification by sex of job advertisements did not violate the
first amendment.32 However, in Bigelow v. Virginia,33 the Supreme
29. Id. at 53.
30. Id. at 55. The Court defined commercial speech:
1. This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and
that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in
the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these'
public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to
what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what
extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are
matters for legislative judgement. The question is not whether the legislative body may
interfere with the harmless pursuit of a lawful business, but whether it must permit
such pursuit by what it deems an undesirable invasion of, or interference with, the full
and free use of the highways by the people in fulfillment of the public use to which
streets are dedicated.
Id. at 54-55.
31. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
32. Id. at 385. The Court stated:
The commercial-speech doctrine is traceable to the brief opinion in Valentine v.
Chrestensen ....
Subsequent cases have demonstrated, however, that speech is not rendered commer-
cial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement. In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan . . . a city official of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a libel action against
four clergymen and the New York Times. The names of the clergymen had appeared
in an advertisement, carried in the Times, criticizing police action directed against
members of the civil rights movement. ...
Mr. Justice Brennan, for the Court, found the Chrestensen advertisement easily distin-
guishable:
"The publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which
the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest
and concern."
In the crucial respects, the advertisements in the present record resemble the
Chrestensen rather than the Sullivan advertisement.
Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted).
33. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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Court said advertising was not stripped of all first amendment pro-
tection if there was an element of pure speech in the message." The
Court found a Virginia statute which prohibited the promotion of
abortion" unconstitutional as applied to newspaper advertise-
ments."6 It stated that the degree of infringement on any first
amendment right must be balanced against the importance of a
legitimate government purpose. 7
Since every anti-sign ordinance encumbers speech to some extent,
the Linmark court first determined whether the speech involved
deserved protection by the stringent standards applied under the
first amendment. The signs were primarily commercial advertise-
ment, and had a substantial non-speech element. In Bigelow the
pure speech element was explicit in the message of the advertise-
ment; in Linmark, the pure speech element (i.e., the owner is mov-
ing) was implied in the signs2 The Linmark court pointed out that
while commercial speech enjoys some protection, the manner of
communication may be regulated when its effect is detrimental and
when the element of pure speech is minimal. °
In Chrestensen, the manner of communication was distribution of
handbills, and the purpose of the regulation apparently was to avoid
litter in the streets." In Linmark, the communication was in signs
displayed at private homes.4" The purpose of the ordinance was not
to enhance the cleanliness of the city, but to prevent an anticipated
reaction to the signs themselves.43
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,44 which was decided after Linmark, the Su-
preme Court found unconstitutional a Virginia statute which de-
clared it was unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to
advertise the prices of prescription drugs. 5 The Court said speech
34. Id. at 826.
35. Id. at 812.
36. Id. at 829.
37. Id. at 826.
38. 535 F.2d at 794.
39. Id. at 795.
40. Id.
41. 316 U.S. at 53 n.1.
42. 535 F.2d at 789.
43. Id. at 800.
44. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
45. Id. at 1826-30.
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which does nothing more than propose a commercial transaction
deserves protection." The Court reviewed its standards for the regu-
lation of commercial speech. Restrictions must be justifiable with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech, must serve a
significant government interest and must leave unimpeded suffi-
cient alternative means of communicating the information. 7 The
Court specifically objected to the denial of information to the com-
mercial targets of advertising who would benefit from the informa-
tion contained therein." Advertising the price of prescription drugs
would serve consumer intersts.1
In view of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, it is arguable that
the ordinance in Linmark fell short of the Supreme Court standard
since restrictions on the signs were intended to suppress the com-
mercial message that houses were for sale or had been sold. Al-
though the Linmark court noted that there remained sufficient al-
ternative methods of communicating the desire to sell to prospective
buyers, 0 the signs were prohibited precisely because of their effec-
tiveness in informing homeowners of sales and proposed sales.
Neighborhood homeowners are not the targets of housing advertise-
ment. However, they do have an interest in the information con-
tained therein.
Citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, a recent New York
case"' said:52
46. Id. at 1826. The Court stated:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numer-
ous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions,
in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commer-
cial information is indispensable.
Id. at 1827.
47. Id. at 1830.
What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that informa-
tion's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions, we
conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative.
Id. at 1831 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 1826-27.
49. Id.
50. 535 F.2d at 797.
51. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 87 Misc. 2d 600, 386 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct.
1976).
52. Id. at 770.
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[tihe United States Supreme Court has now made clear that commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment . . Restrictions with respect
to time, place and manner . are still permissible, provided they are justi-
fied without reference to the content of the regulated speech . ....
The Linmark decision stated that a municipality could limit com-
mercial speech in order to achieve a valid government goal.53 Ac-
cordingly, the court examined the purpose and effect of the Willing-
boro ordinance. It found a legitimate public interest in avoiding the
psychological climate which would lead to panic selling and eventu-
ally to resegregation. 4
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.55 established the shaping
of the community as a legitimate government interest, even if the
resulting ordinances restrict the use of private land.5" However, a
local ordinance is invalid if its effect is to give support to racial
discrimination in the sale or rent of property."
A local ordinance may .regulate housing advertisements to
conform to the anti-discriminatory provisions of section 3604(e) of
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.11 In United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, Inc.," representations to homeowners about the racially
changing composition of their neighborhoods were part of a group
pattern of statutory violations by all real estate agents in the area."0
The court found an overriding government interest in preventing
53. 535 F.2d at 795.
54. Id. at 799.
55. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard. If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning pur-
poses be fairly debatable, the legislative judgement must be allowed to control.
Id. at 388.
56. Id. at 389.
57. Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (Supp. V, 1975), made it unlawful "for profit, to induce or attempt
to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or
prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."
The court in United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1971), interpreted the
section:
In delineating what Congress means by "representations" in § 3604(e) the court must
keep in mind the basic purpose of the sections: to prevent persons from preying on the
fears of property owners and inducing panic selling resulting in monetary loss to the
sellers and instability in the neighborhoods involved.
Id. at 479.
59. 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
60. 474 F.2d at 118.
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blockbusting which outweighed the informational value of such
commercial conduct. 2
However, when restrictions apply only to realtors and not to
homeowners, they are abridgements of due process. 3 In DeKalb
Real Estate Board, Inc. v. Chairman of the Board of Commis-
sioners,"1 an ordinance required brokers to delete their names
from "for sale" signs because a large display of signs of realtors
known to be black or to deal with blacks might engender panic
selling. " The district court held the ordinance was vague and over-
broad, since there was no connection between the display of the
signs and the prohibition against blockbusting.6 Linmark can be
distinguished from DeKalb since the ordinance in DeKalb was not
equally applied to realtors and homeowners. 7
In Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary,"5 the city enacted an
ordinance forbidding the display of "sold" or "for sale" signs. 9 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the ordinance was reason-
able and appropriate to stop panic selling and white flight from
61. In the classic blockbusting pattern, a realtor suggests to white homeowners that their
neighborhood will soon become black, that this will cause a depression in prices, and that
they had better sell quickly to avoid losing their investments and being among the last whites
on the block. Such personal contact is typically reinforced with a rash of "for sale" and "sold"
signs. Realtors are then able to buy housing at low prices and to sell at high prices to incoming
blacks, thus contributing to the resegregation of the neighborhood. See Note, Blockbusting,
59 GEO. L.J. 170, 171-76 (1970).
62. 474 F.2d at 121. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of
section 804, the anti-blockbusting section of the Fair Housing Act. Citing Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the court said the thirteenth amendment gives Congress
power to enact laws operating upon the individual in order to enforce the prohibition against
slavery and to abolish all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States. 474 F.2d at
120. Congress thus had the power to enact section 804. Id. Furthermore, the statute was not
violative of the first amendment, since it regulates commercial activity, not speech. Id. at
121.
The statute is aimed at the commercial activities of those who would profiteer off the
ills of society, conduct that the Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress to regu-
late.
Id.
63. DeKalb Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. Chairman of Bd. of Comm'rs, 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D.
Ga. 1973).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 754.
66. Id. at 755.
67. Id.
68. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'g 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
69. 491 F.2d at 163.
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racially changing neighborhoods. The lower court had found that
the public interest in maintaining constitutionally mandated open
housing outweighed the ordinance's regulation of commercial
speech7 and that there was no evidence of legislative intent to in-
hibit integration.7 In affirming the lower court opinion, the court of
appeals defended the concept of racial balancing:7"
It is clearly consistent with the Constitution and federal housing policy for
Gary to pursue a policy of encouraging stable integrated neighborhoods and
discouraging brief integration followed by prompt resegregation, even if an
effect of that policy is to reduce the number of blacks moving into certain
areas of the city.
In Barrick, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
argued as amicus curiae that both blacks and whites had an interest
in stable communities sufficient to outweigh the inconveniences in
finding alternative methods of advertising and learning about
homes for sale."
The district court in Linmark had distinguished Barrick as in-
volving established evidence of panic-selling and blockbusting oc-
curring in formerly white neighborhoods. However, the court of
appeals stated that there was evidence of increasing concern about
the signs among homeowners in Willingboro.75 Attempts at block-
busting were anticipated because of the interest of out-of-town real-
tors.6 Thus, the court found Barrick relevant. It approved the Wil-
lingboro ordinance as an attempt to forestall segregation."
In his dissent, Judge Gibbons pointed to testimony from realtors
and members of the community that there was concern in Willing-
70. 354 F. Supp. at 132.
71. Id. at 136.
72. 491 F.2d at 164-65.
73. Id. at 165.
74. Slip Op. at 3.
75. 535 F.2d at 798-99.
76. Id. at 807 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 802. The court of appeals alluded to a 1975 report by the United States Civil
Rights Commission to demonstrate that success in maintaining integration was unusual. Id.
at 789 n.1. Figures in the report show that most blacks in cities live in areas which are 50
percent or more black. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TwENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, 124, 128-29 (1975). Even though blacks in suburbs are more inte-
grated with whites, suburban neighborhoods often become black enclaves. Id. at 119, 131.
For a discussion of "Balkanization" of cities and surrounding suburbs, see BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CITY: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N OF URBAN PROBLEMS TO THE CONGRESS AND
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1968).
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boro over the relative growth of the black and minority population
and the possible effect of that growth on property values."8 Each
witness quoted in the dissent said that the proscribed signs had
engendered this concern and that the ordinance would slow the
change in the racial composition of the population." The dissent
found the evidence clearly supported the district court's conclusion
that Willingboro intended to facilitate discrimination against
blacks by stabilizing the non-white population at not more than 20
percent." Judge Gibbons also asserted that in the nearby com-
munity of Medford Lakes, an ordinance prohibiting "for sale" and
"sold" signs, together with an understanding among realtors that
they were not to direct blacks to that area, had worked to maintain
segregation."'
The majority had pointed out that there was no evidence offered
concerning the effect of the Medford Lakes sign ordinance on a
longstanding pattern of discrimination and that the ordinance itself
had not been offered into evidence for comparison with the Willing-
boro ordinance.2
Although the Linmark court did not acknowledge the Willingboro
ordinance as an attempt to balance the racial composition of the
town, it found the purpose of the ordinance was to prevent resegre-
gation. 3 Yet, in order to discourage resegregation, a community
must also discourage a proportionally large ingress of minorities.
Thus in Linmark two goals which the courts and statutes have
supported came into conflict: that no person should be denied the
opportunity to buy a particular house because of his race,84 and that
a community should be populated by all racial and ethnic groups
represented in its area." There has been no legislative or judicial
78. 535 F.2d at 809 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 807-10.
80. Id. at 811.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 803 n.27.
83. Id. at 797.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (Supp. V, 1975); id. § 3613 (1970). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973).
In this case the court stated:
The anti-blockbusting statute, § 3604(e), is an attempt by Congress to disprove the
belief, held by many, that the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation
cannot keep. Integrated housing is deemed by many to be an a priori requirement
[Vol. V
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determination of the constitutionality of community attempts to
compromise between the aims of open housing and integration.
The Supreme Court has stated: "It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled . . . ." It has said that it is within the power
of the legislature to determine that a community should not be
segregated because of racial discrimination in sales and rentals. It
has not said whether it is within the power of the legislature to
determine that a community should be racially integrated.
The Linmark court found the Willingboro ordinance would bene-
fit the community as a whole by helping to maintain integration.
Nonetheless, the ordinance was intended to suppress the message
of the signs and thus to reduce the number of commercial transac-
tions which the signs promoted. If the Linmark decision does not
survive the Supreme Court's latest construction of first amendment
protection of commercial speech because the Willingboro ordinance
restricts the content of the regulated speech, the important question
of the legitimacy of racial balancing as a legislative goal will remain
unanswered.
Mary M. Popper
before our schools can be realistically integrated. . . . [It is indisputable that white
flight is a blight upon the democratized society we envision and this Congressional Act
is in the mainstream of that vision.
Id. at 127.
86. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
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